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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Richard W. Knight appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 A grand jury indicted Knight on two counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
and one count of sex abuse of a minor.  (State’s Exhibit A.1)   During the 2012 
trial, S.B., Knight’s 15-year-old grand-daughter, testified that Knight sexually 
abused her numerous times over several years.  (State’s Exhibit E, p.189, Ls.3-
15; p.194, Ls.8-19; p.197, L.4 – p.224, L.11.)  S.B.’s friend, 16-year-old K.B., 
testified that Knight sexually abused her when she and S.B. spent the night at 
Knight’s house in August 2011.  (State’s Exhibit E, p.253, L.7 – p.268, L.2.)  The 
state also submitted into evidence an audio recording of a confrontation phone 
call between S.B. and Knight, and audio recordings of two police interviews with 
Knight.  (State’s Exhibit F, p.153, L.16 – p.167, L.21.)         
 The jury found Knight guilty on all three counts.  (State’s Exhibit F, p.243, 
Ls.3-14.)  The district court imposed concurrent unified 20-year sentences with 
10 years fixed on both of the lewd conduct charges, and a concurrent unified 15-
year sentence with five years fixed on the sex abuse charge.  (State’s Exhibit B.)   
The district court denied Knight’s subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of 
                                                 
1 The state attached several documents associated with Knight’s underlying 
criminal proceeding to its Answer filed in response to Knight’s post-conviction 





sentence.  (State’s Exhibit C.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Knight’s 
sentences on direct appeal.  State v. Knight, Docket No. 40614, 2014 
Unpublished Opinion No. 379 (Idaho App., February 19, 2014). 
 In May 2014, Knight filed a post-conviction petition.  (R., pp.4-11.)  The 
district court appointed counsel to represent Knight in the proceeding.  (R., 
pp.47-48.)  Appointed counsel filed an amended petition alleging three ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  (R., pp.67-83.)  Specifically, Knight alleged 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to call Knight as a witness at 
trial; (2) inadequately cross-examining several of the state’s witnesses; and (3) 
failing to meet with Knight prior to the sentencing hearing.  (Id.)    
 The district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of the 
post-conviction petition.  (R., pp.76-83, 168-182.)  The court concluded that 
Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief 
as to any of his claims.  (Id.)  Knight timely appealed.  (R., pp.183-186.)  The 
district court appointed counsel to represent Knight in his appeal (R., pp.191-193), 
but the Idaho Supreme Court later granted appointed counsel’s motion to 

















 Knight states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did [the] Judge Erroneously [Deny] Petitioner’s Post-
Conviction Relief Petition First Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel [sic]. 
 
2. Did [the] Judge Erroneously [Deny] Petitioner’s Post-
Conviction Relief Petition Second Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel  [sic]. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
   
 The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Has Knight failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 

































Knight Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
 Knight contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing two of 
the claims in his post-conviction petition.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  
Specifically, Knight contends that the district court erred by dismissing his claims 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness at the trial, 
and for inadequately cross-examining certain state witnesses.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.5-8.)  A review of the record reveals that Knight failed to allege facts which, if 
true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief as to either of these claims.  
Therefore, he cannot show that the district court erred.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
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burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983).    
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).  
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true.  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975).  However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the 
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone 
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.  State v. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008).  That is, the judge in a 
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the 
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.  Id. 
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D. Knight Has Failed To Demonstrate He Was Entitled To Relief As To Any Of 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by 
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.  Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).  
“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ….”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).   
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Knight’s Claim That His Trial 
 Counsel Was Ineffective For Advising Him Not To Testify At Trial 
 
Knight contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him 
as a witness at the jury trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6; see also R., pp.68-69.)  
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Knight’s claim fails because the allegations upon which it is based were 
conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.   
At the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Knight’s 
counsel clarified the scope of this claim – that Knight was alleging only that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness, not that he was 
deprived of his constitutional right to testify.  (Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.4.)  The district 
court recognized this distinction and properly analyzed the claim pursuant to 
Strickland.  (R., pp.173-176.) 
Within the petition itself, Knight did not allege that he was prevented by his 
counsel from testifying, that he expressed to his counsel a desire to testify, or that 
his counsel misled him about his constitutional right to testify.  (R., pp.68-69.)  
Instead, Knight acknowledged that he had pretrial discussions with his counsel 
about whether he should testify, and that his counsel advised him that he “should 
not” testify.  (R., pp.68-69, 74.)  In the affidavit supporting his petition, Knight 
alleged that he would have testified that he did not commit the crimes, that he 
was living in Rhode Island for approximately two and one-half years between 
2007 and 2009, that S.B. hit and kicked him several times over the last several 
years, that he had threatened to put S.B. in juvenile detention, and that S.B. told 
him that she would “do something to him” if Knight followed through on the 
detention threat.  (R., p.74.)  Knight did not present any other evidence 
supporting these factual assertions.  (See R., pp.67-83.)       
The district court properly dismissed this claim.  (R., pp.173-176.)  The 
court recognized that Knight failed to present any admissible evidence indicating 
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that his counsel’s advice that he not testify constituted deficient performance.  (R., 
p.174.)  Instead, without any allegations or evidence of coercion, or that counsel 
actively prevented Knight from testifying, counsel’s decision to advise Knight not 
to testify was instead a “virtually unchallengeable” strategic decision.  Knight 
could have chosen to decline counsel’s advice and instead exercise his right to 
testify. 
The district court also analyzed Knight’s proffered testimony in the context 
of the testimony actually elicited at trial.  (R., pp.174-176.)  It is clear from the trial 
transcript that Knight’s counsel was aware that Knight had briefly lived in Rhode 
Island during a portion of the time-frame of the sexual abuse, as alleged in the 
indictment.  Knight’s counsel referenced Knight’s temporary Rhode Island 
residency in a discussion about counsel’s intent to impeach S.B.’s mother.  
(State’s Exhibit F, p.34, L.19 – p.36, L.22.)  Additionally, S.B.’s mother testified  
that Knight lived in Rhode Island while S.B.’s father was home between tours of 
military duty in Iraq.  (State’s Exhibit F, p.55, L.18 – p.56, L.24.)  Knight’s counsel 
expressly declined to attempt to utilize this evidence for alibi purposes.  (State’s 
Exhibit F, p.34, L.19 – p.36, L.12.)  The reason for this strategic decision is clear 
from the record.  Even assuming the accuracy of the time-frame Knight alleges 
he was in Rhode Island (sometime between 2007 and 2009), this does not 
disprove the sexual abuse which was alleged to have occurred between March 
2007 and August 2011.  In his amended petition and supporting affidavit, Knight 
does not identify any specific witness testimony which would have been 
disproven or called into question by any additional testimony regarding Knight’s 
9 
 
alleged residency in Rhode Island.  Further, Knight’s own proffered testimony 
indicates that he had contact with S.B. over the relevant period of time.  (R., 
pp.74-75.)      
The district court also recognized that S.B.’s “aggressive” physical conduct 
towards Knight and S.B.’s potential motives for fabricating her allegations were 
both explored by defense counsel in his cross-examination of state witnesses.  
(R., pp.175-176; see also State’s Exhibit E, p.237, L.13 – p.238, L.15; p.242, 
Ls.12-22; State’s Exhibit F, p.51, L.16 – p.52, L.14.)  Knight’s counsel also 
discussed the defense theories regarding S.B.’s and K.B.’s alleged motives for 
fabricating their allegations during his closing argument.  (State’s Exhibit F, p.227, 
L.6 – p.228, L.1.)  Knight failed to make a prima facie showing that his counsel’s 
strategic decision to present these defense theories to the jury through other 
witnesses, as opposed to through Knight himself, was based upon inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation.  Therefore, Knight has failed to demonstrate deficient performance.  
For similar reasons, Knight has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by this decision.      
Because Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to 
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to 





2. The District Court Properly Dismissed Knight’s Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Conducting Inadequate Cross-
Examination Of State Witnesses 
 
 Knight contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately 
cross-examining certain state witnesses.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8; see also R., 
pp.69-70.)  Knight’s claim fails because the allegations upon which it is based 
were conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.   
 In his amended petition, Knight alleged that “proper” cross-examination of 
S.B., S.B.’s mother, and K.B. would have revealed: Knight was across the 
country and “incapable of committing the alleged crimes during most of the time 
period alleged,” that S.B. and K.B. “misrepresented critical facts to the jury,” that 
S.B. “previously repeatedly and without provocation attacked and caused harm” 
to Knight, and that S.B. had a motive to retaliate against Knight and to fabricate 
her testimony.  (R., pp.69-70.)  Knight did not identify specifically what facts S.B. 
and K.B. allegedly “misrepresented” to the jury, or what the nature of S.B.’s 
alleged motive to retaliate against Knight was in the context of this claim.  (See 
R., pp.67-75.) 
 The district court recognized the conclusory nature of this claim and 
properly dismissed it.  (R., pp.176-178.)  As discussed above, Knight’s alleged 
short-term residency in Rhode Island did not provide him an alibi for the charged 
conduct.  Further, Knight’s counsel engaged in significant cross-examination and 
recross-examination of S.B., S.B.’s mother, and K.B., and inquired about such 
matters as S.B.’s aggressive physical conduct towards Knight, S.B.’s potential 
motives to retaliate against Knight, and alleged inconsistencies contained within 
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the testimony of these witnesses.  (State’s Exhibit E, p.231, L.16 – p.242, L.24; 
p.249, L.20 – p.251, L.7; p.268, L.6 – p.277, L.5; State’s Exhibit F, p.39, L.1 – 
p.41, L.2; p.45, Ls.1-18; p.50, L.7 – p.55, L.2; p.58, Ls.8-23.)  Knight’s counsel 
also discussed these matters in his closing argument.  (State’s Exhibit F, p.224, 
L.21 – p.228, L.13; p.232, Ls.15-19.)    
Knight failed to make a prima facie showing that his counsel’s strategic 
decisions regarding the cross-examination of state witnesses was based upon 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable 
of objective evaluation.  Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate deficient 
performance.  For similar reasons, Knight has also failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by any deficiency.       
Because Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to 
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
cross-examine state witnesses, this Court should affirm the trial court’s summary 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order summarily dismissing Knight’s petition for post-conviction relief. 




       /s/ Mark W. Olson _________________ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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